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Cambodia is in the midst of trying some of the leaders of the Khmer Rouge for their actions during the 
time of the Killing Fields. Beyond the effects on individual victims and perpetrators, many will ask 
whether this process of historical accountability will have a broader impact on Cambodian society and 
political culture.  
One possible consequence of the trials is that the attitudes of ordinary Cambodians toward the 
rule of law will be affected. One hypothesis is that the trials will restore faith in the rule of law, a faith 
undermined by the failure of the state to take action against the miscreants for thirty years. Other 
hypotheses are also tenable. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the attitudes of Cambodians toward the rule of law. Based 
on a nationally representative survey conducted in 2007 – well before the trials began – our evidence is 
that Cambodians hold an extremely strong preference for strict adherence to legal universalism. Because 
support for the rule of law is so strong, the trials are highly unlikely to make it stronger. From the point-
of-view of transitional justice processes, we argue that (1) it is crucial to know the state of society prior to 
the implementation of justice processes so that change can be measured; (2) cultural values such as 
support for the rule of law are as likely to be causes of transitional justice processes as they are results; 
and (3) because much too little is known about the societal consequences of transitional justice processes, 
much more rigorous, quantitative analysis must be conducted. 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1491077
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The trials of the former leaders of the Khmer Rouge (KR) began earlier this year. In July 2007, Duch 
(Kaing Guek Eav) was charged with crimes against humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva conventions 
of 1949, torture and murder for his role as chief at the S21 prison in the capital, Phnom Penh 
(Extraordinary Chambers, 2009). Four other Khmer Rouge leaders are in custody, awaiting trial, and 
others — perhaps even former king Norodom Shihanouk — may be required to appear before the 
Extraordinary Chamber in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC). The future is still quite uncertain, but some 
measure of justice may yet come to the land of the killing fields.  
 The trials have several purposes. Obviously, holding the leaders of the former regime accountable 
for human rights violations during their reign of terror is a primary objective of the process. But the trials 
also seek a broader goal: what might be called reconciliation. Although the term has many – and many 
contested – meanings, reconciliation generally involves societal transformation, with friend and foe 
seeking a means of living together in peaceful tolerance and coexistence. As with virtually all transitional 
justice processes, the Cambodian efforts to address its past seek several objectives simultaneously.  
 For instance, one important aspect of reconciliation, according to Gibson’s (2004) analysis of the 
South African truth and reconciliation process, is support for the rule of law: Citizens must value the rule 
of law and be willing to support limits on the actions government can undertake. The rule of law is 
important since it can stand as an impediment to tyrannical rule. To the degree that a political culture 
holds law in high esteem, the arbitrary rule often preferred by tyrants is discouraged. Consequently, it is 
not surprising that building a “rule of law culture” was one of the specific mandates assigned to South 
Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). One aspiration of the Khmer Rouge trials is to 
hold the leaders responsible for their actions (albeit belatedly) and thereby to build respect for the rule of 
law within Cambodian society. 
 Reconciliation is a process of change. Unfortunately, however, change is rarely analyzed in 
studies of reconciliation. Gibson’s (2004) important study of South Africa, for instance, is based on a 
single cross-sectional survey, so, even though he uses statistical and logical techniques to make inferences 
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about change, such inferences inspire only limited confidence that truth actually caused a change in 
reconciliation. Although dynamic inferences can be (and routinely are) made from static data, the most 
useful research design for studying the effects of such processes as the Khmer Rouge trials is a 
longitudinal one. 
 This paper does not report a longitudinal analysis, however. Instead, the purpose of this paper is 
to investigate the “baseline” condition of Cambodian political culture prior to the initiation of the KR 
trials. In particular, we assess the degree to which Cambodians regarded the rule of law highly prior to the 
trials. The basic assumption of many is that human rights abuses from the past undermined support for 
the rule of law, and that some process must be implemented in order to rectify that deficit. Based on a 
nationally representative survey conducted in early 2007, we investigate that hypothesis. Our specific 
purposes here are to assess several empirical questions. (1) How supportive are Cambodians of the rule of 
law? (2) How do Cambodians compare with citizens of other polities? (3) Are young Cambodians, who 
did not directly experience the terror of the KR, different from and more supportive of the rule of law than 
older Cambodians? (4) More specifically, is there a connection between suffering abuses under the prior 
regime and one’s attitudes toward law today? By answering these questions, we will establish a baseline 
of support for the rule law, against which changes over the course of the trials can be assessed. 
Establishing the initial level of support for the rule of law – as well as how such support is distributed 
throughout Cambodian society – is crucial if the effects of this transitional process are to be accurately 
estimated and assessed.  
 The most important findings of this paper are that support for the rule of law is widespread in 
Cambodian society even well before the trials of the KR leaders commenced. Indeed, in comparative 
perspective, the Cambodians revere the rule of law as much as any polity within which surveys of mass 
opinion have been conducted. Our most general conclusions are that the horrific Cambodian past has 
caused citizens to value the rule of law, that public support for the rule of law may well have been a cause 
of the ECCC rather than a consequence of it, and that any efforts to understand the impact of the ECCC 
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on Cambodian political culture must consider the nature of that culture prior to the creation and 
implementation of the tribunal. 
 
The Rule of Law and Democratic Theory 
Democratic theorists have long placed a great deal of emphasis on the rule of law as a crucial contributor 
to effective democracy. In its minimalist manifestation, the rule of law is little more than proper 
procedure. It asserts that, in a democracy, rulers are bound to rule via established procedures and legal 
constraints. The rule of law constrains discretion; what one may prefer to do at the moment may not be 
possible owing to existing law. From this perspective, the rule of law implies little substantive content.1
Where power is arbitrary, personal and unpredictable, the citizenry will not know how to 
behave, will fear that any action may produce an unforeseen risk. Essentially, the rule of 
law means at least two things: one, that people will be treated equally by the institutions 
administering the law, the courts, the police, and the civil service; second, that they can 
predict with reasonable certainty the consequences of their actions, at least as far as the 
state is concerned (Lipset 1994, 15).  
 
Instead, it is rule by procedure. As Lipset has noted:  
 An important function of the rule of law is to impede tyranny. The logic is simple and 
compelling. Both masses and elites are often confronted with circumstances in which their interests are at 
odds with the requirement of democratic politics. Masses may wish to stifle political expression by 
                                                 
1According to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the rule of law “refers to a principle 
of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself, 
are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, 
and which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards. It requires, as well, 
measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, equality before the law, 
accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of powers, participation in 
decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency” 
(Report of the Secretary-General 2004, 4, emphasis added). Thus, the Secretary-General disagrees with 
our understanding of the rule of law by imposing substantive requirements. Because it is so much easier 
to get agreement on procedures from all sides in politics, in contrast to attaining consensus on substantive 




 Of course, pernicious schemes can be implemented through impeccable democratic procedures — 
South Africa’s apartheid was a legal edifice properly enacted by the country’s parliament — but to do so 
typically requires open debate and the agreement of the majority. In addition, legal procedure slows down 
disputes, allowing cooler heads to prevail.
; elites often seek ways to undermine the effectiveness of their political challengers.  
The rule of law protects against arbitrary intrusions on individual liberty, be they from above or below.  
3
 Within this context, the rule of law constrains both rulers and the ruled. The rulers must act 
according to legal procedure, which means they must rule through legislatures and courts. The ruled are 
obliged to follow these laws, to acquiesce to them. When the self interests of rulers and ruled conflict with 
the law, law must prevail, at least until it is changed via legitimate democratic procedure.  
 The rule of law requires that schemes of repression be openly 
implemented rather than simply pronounced by a ruler or a mob, thereby making repression more difficult 
to implement. 
 Thus, the essential ingredient of this construct is universalism – law ought to be universally 
heeded, that is, obeyed and complied with. To the extent that law generates an undesirable outcome, law 
ought to be changed through established procedures, rather than manipulated or ignored. Willingness to 
abide by the law is pivotal to the concept.  
 The antithesis of universalism is particularism, based typically on either expedience or on the 
substitution of some sort of moral judgment for legality. Some may feel that law should be set aside (or 
bent) in favor of solving problems quickly or efficiently, while others may be unwilling to accept legal 
                                                 
2It should not be assumed that all violations of the rule of law necessarily go against the perceived 
self-interest of the majority. For instance, Solomon (1992) points to instances in the former Soviet Union 
in which ordinary citizens demanded that the authorities dispense with the rule of law in dealing with 
suspects in notorious criminal cases. There were many instances in which South African "people's justice" 
had little to do with the rule of law (and perhaps not that much to do with justice either). It is easy to 
imagine that runaway crime is an instance in which the majority may be willing to sacrifice the rule of 
law for more expedient remedies.  
3No better example of this can be found than in the controversy in Skokie, Illinois, on whether to 
allow a public demonstration by a small group of neo-Nazis. Gibson and Bingham (1985) have argued 
that by moving the dispute into the courts, delay was created, allowing passions to cool a bit, making a 
democratic outcome to the controversy more likely. Some refer to this as giving political conflicts a 
“sober second thought” (see Stouffer 1955; Gibson 1998). 
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outcomes that, by some standards, are “unjust.”4
 We must acknowledge, however, that freedom is sometimes lost under the guise of law; and not 
all authoritarian governments necessarily reject the rule of law. As Krygier reminds us: “There was, after 
all, a Nazi jurisprudence, and it was a horrible sight” (1990, 641). Much of the early Nazi attack on 
German Jews was accomplished under the authority of law. And of course, no government would 
repudiate the rule of law openly, since the rule of law is a powerful and seemingly universal means of 
legitimizing authority. Rule of law may be essential to democratic governance, but law can, under some 
circumstances, serve dictators as well as democrats. The correlation between strict adherence to legal 
universalism and democracy is certainly less than perfect.   
 To the extent that people are willing to follow the law 
only if it satisfies some external criterion, the rule of law is compromised. Respect for the rule of law thus 
means that following the law (universalism) is accorded more weight than other values that might trump 
legality, such as expediency or even fairness.  
 
A Cultural Definition of the Rule of Law 
In an effective democracy, the rule of law must of course be manifest in the political institutions of the 
country — which is to say little more than that clearly defined, predictable procedures for both law 
making and law implementation must exist.  
 But rule of law is more than a set of institutions, more than a constitution and a statute book. 
Indeed, perhaps the most important manifestation of the rule of law is in its representation in a nation’s 
culture – the set of beliefs, expectations, values, and attitudes held by the populace of a country. When we 
speak of corruption, for instance, as antithetical to the rule of law, we often are referring to a set of norms 
and expectations about whether corrupt behavior is acceptable within a polity. This refers to “ways of 
doing business,” which are in part institutionally determined, but which are in larger part culturally 
                                                 
4For earlier research using a similar conceptualization of universalism and particularism see 
Levin 1972, 1977; Wilson 1976; Gibson and Caldeira 1996; Gibson and Gouws 1997; and Gibson 2003, 
2004, and 2007. 
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legitimized.5 Acknowledging that institutions are important, Krygier (1990, 646, emphasis in original) 
points to "something far vaguer but fundamentally more important: a widespread assumption within 
society that law matters and should matter." Thus, we can speak of a rule of law both in terms of formal 
institutions and a rule of law culture. Without a culture that rejects the sublimation of law to other more 
pressing objectives, a Rechtsstaat cannot effectively function.6
 Analyses of cultural norms and values have a long and distinguished legacy within the social 
sciences (e.g., Almond and Verba 1963). But this approach has also achieved great currency lately among 
economists and legal analysts, as in their concern with social norms. Etzioni writes of the importance of 
these norms: “. . .  it is widely held that strong social norms reduce the burden on law enforcement; that 
laws supported by social norms are likely to be significantly more enforceable; and that laws that are 
formulated in ways that are congruent with social norms are much more likely to be enacted than laws 
that offend such norms” (2000, 159). In essence, Etzioni and others are asserting that if we are to 
understand how law and politics actually operate within a polity, we need to look beyond institutions to 
examine the cultural norms and values that undergird the institutions and that shape the behavior of 
individual citizens. 
 Understanding how a political or legal 
system operates always requires far more than understanding the structure and function of institutions, but 
when it comes to understanding the meaning of the rule of law in a country, culture is paramount. 
 
                                                 
5As Hoffman (1998, 148) asserts in the case of the Former Soviet Union: “The transformation of 
democratic forms into democratic norms  . . .  is crucial for democracy to take root throughout Russia.” 
Diamond (1999, 65) concurs, noting that the consolidation of democratic reform is only possible when 
“political competitors  . . .  come to regard democracy (and the laws, procedures, and institutions it 
specifies) as ‘the only game in town,’ the only viable framework for governing the society and advancing 
their own interests. At the mass level, there must be a broad normative and behavioral consensus – one 
that cuts across class, ethnic, nationality, and other cleavages – on the legitimacy of the constitutional 
system, however poor or unsatisfying its performance may be at any point in time.” 
6Many have argued that a rule of law state (a Rechtsstaat) is a necessary condition for democratic 
governance (e.g., Rose, Mishler, and Haerpfer 1998, 32-33). By this they mean that the state should be 
bound by law and cannot act arbitrarily or capriciously. Respect for the rule of law thus means that 
following the law (universalism) is accorded more priority than other values that might trump legality, 




The Rule of Law and Reconciliation 
Gibson’s (2004) earlier research on reconciliation in South Africa explicitly postulates that one of the four 
pillars of reconciliation is mass support for the rule of law. According to this theory of reconciliation, for 
South Africa’s nascent democracy to prosper, the political culture must be one in which the universalistic 
application of the rule of law – and the rejection of the arbitrary exercise of governmental authority and 
power – is deeply valued and respected. The legislation establishing the TRC agreed with this theory, and 
called for the development of a culture respectful of human rights in South Africa. Perhaps the “first 
principle” of such a culture is respect for the rule of law. In particular, a human rights culture cannot be 
established without a commitment to the universal application of law, and especially the unwillingness to 
set law aside to accomplish other objectives. Thus, a reconciled society is one in which ordinary people 
support the rule of law, both as a constraint on their own actions and on the actions of the government.  
 To what extent is support for the rule of law pervasive within the Cambodian political culture? 
Our 2007 survey of a representative sample of Cambodians addresses this question. 
 
Research Design 
This research is based on a national probability sample of 1,017 adult Cambodians aged 18 years and 
older that was assembled using a multi-stage stratified cluster design. A face-to-face interview was 
conducted in 2006/2007 by trained interviewers employed by the Center for Advanced Study, a not-for-
profit survey research organization, based in Phnom Penh, Cambodia. 
 The total sample was designed to be representative of the non-institutionalized population, 18 
years old and older, of the Kingdom of Cambodia.  However, we wanted to focus attention on adults who 
were at least three years of age at the start of the Khmer Rouge era, in 1975, 32 years prior to the start of 
the survey.  Accordingly, we deliberately over-sampled adults over the age of 35. 
 
 8 
Based on a standard formula from the American Association for Public Opinion Research 
(AAPOR), the cooperation rate, i.e., the percentage of persons who participated among those who were 
eligible, available and physically able to participate, was 94.2%.  The AAPOR response rate, i.e., the 
percentage of persons who participated among those who were eligible (both available and unavailable) 
and those of unknown eligibility, based on the assumption that all of the households of unknown 
eligibility were actually eligible (i.e., the assumption that would result in the lowest calculated response 
rate), was 59.5%.   If we assume, still conservatively, that eligibility among households of unknown 
eligibility was equal to the eligibility of all households of known eligibility (or 87.6% in this study), the 
response rate is 61.7%. The difference between the cooperation rate and the response rate was due to a 
relatively large number of households (N = 457) that were selected but which were vacant during the time 
of the survey.  Sample demographic characteristics were similar to those of the Cambodian population. 
(See Sonis et al. (2009) for details.) 
 The questionnaire was translated into Khmer and back-translated into English using standard 
methodology.  The instrument was extensively pilot-tested using the “talk aloud” method in a three-day 
group interview with a convenience sample of 15 residents of Phnom Penh and then further pilot-tested 
and revised with 60 respondents from rural areas near Phnom Penh.  
The Center hired and trained 18 Cambodian research assistants from the Phnom Penh area who 
traveled in two separate research teams, from December 25, 2006 to January 23, 2007, throughout the 
country to conduct the survey.  Because of logistical difficulties in getting to 4 villages in January 2007, 
interviews (N=20) were conducted by one of the research teams in those villages between August 26, 
2007, and August 28, 2007.  
All analyses accounted for the sampling weights and the design effect introduced by the complex 
sampling scheme.  
The research protocol was approved by the University of North Carolina Behavioral institutional 
review board.  Since there is no equivalent structure in Cambodia, the protocol was also reviewed by a 
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small group of local social scientists who had experience working with trauma survivors.   
 
Measuring Cambodian Support for the Rule of Law 
How supportive are Cambodians of the rule of law?  In order to answer this question, empirical indicators 
of attitudes toward the rule of law must be developed and implemented in a representative survey of the 
Cambodian mass public.  
 Few people are likely to reject the rule of law in principle. Survey questions that ask people 
whether they agree that rulers ought not to act arbitrarily or capriciously or that citizens should be free to 
ignore the law as they please are unlikely to be of much use in tapping popular commitments to the rule of 
law. Instead, the difficult test of support for the rule of law involves the juxtaposition of law and some 
other valued principle. Questions are most useful when they force people to weigh the relative value of 
conflicting principles7
 Consequently, our survey asked people to agree or disagree (on a five-point Likert scale, ranging 
from agree strongly to disagree strongly) with statements pitting the rule of law against another value. In 
one measure, the other value was expediency.
; only when supporting the rule of law involves some cost can we begin to gauge 
how valuable the rule of law is to people. 
8
Sometimes it might be better to ignore the law and solve problems immediately rather 
than wait for a legal solution. 
 The statement is: 
Some of those who oppose the rule of law also do so on grounds of pragmatism, arguing that the rule of 
law can be unnecessarily rigid and confining. Law must be flexible if it is to be effective. We therefore 
asked the respondents their opinions of the following statement. 
                                                 
7For a similar analysis of the relative value Americans ascribe to security and liberty see Davis 
and Silver 2004. 
8Tamanaha (2004) provides a useful analysis of the concept of rule of law.  He identifies three 
major themes in how the rule of law has been understood: government limited by law, formal legality, 
and rule of law, not man.  Although these do not map directly on to the statements we use to measure rule 




In times of emergency, the government ought to be able to suspend the law in order to 
solve pressing social problems. 
Universalism in the application of the rule of law was measured with two statements: 
 It’s alright to get around the law as long as you don’t actually break it. 
 Government officials who are guilty of crimes deserve the same punishment as anyone else.  
Another statement paired the rule of law with personal convictions: 
An individual is obligated to obey the law for the good of society as a whole, even if 
he/she finds it personally unjustifiable.  
Figure 1 reports responses of the respondents to these five propositions. 
[PLACE FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 Considerable variability exists in the replies of the respondents to these statements.9
 These data seem on their face to be incompatible with Cambodian institutions, which, to put it 
 At one 
extreme, nearly all Cambodians agree that government officials who commit wrongdoings should be 
subject to the same punishment as everyone else, and that individuals are obliged to obey laws even if 
they object to them. At the other extreme (which is not nearly so extreme), slightly less than a majority 
assert that it is unacceptable for a government to suspend laws in order to solve pressing social problems. 
In general, however, support for the rule of law seems fairly widespread in Cambodia, as evidenced by 
the fact that, across the set of five statements, the average number of responses favoring the rule of law is 
3.8. These data seem to indicate quite substantial commitments to law even when paired against another 
value. 
                                                 
9To reiterate, rule of law is a multi-dimensional concept, and there are other dimensions of the 
concept that are not explicitly considered here. We explored some of these in our earlier research, but 
those results revealed such widespread support for some aspects of the rule of law that we felt it wasteful 
to devote questions to what are essentially universally held views. Especially when propositions are 
phrased in the abstract, very few people believe that judges ought to be subservient to politicians, that 
governments ought to have the power to ignore law at will, and that law ought to be applied in an 
idiosyncratic, particularistic fashion, etc. On the contrary, the key idea about which people seem to divide 
is the degree to which law ought to be followed even when it produces seemingly undesirable results. 
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mildly, are not generally admired for their strong attachment to the rule of law.10
 The five-item set of indicators has relatively low reliability (α = .58), which reflects a small 
average inter-item correlation (.17).
  Our view is that the 
answers to our rule-of-law questions most likely reflect the aspirations of the Cambodian people, not 
necessarily the realities of how Cambodian society operates. Indeed, as Duch and Gibson (1992) contend, 
people deprived of a political right or institution may well come to value that right or institution more 
highly than people who have grown accustomed to its protections. Most Cambodians seems to view the 
rule of law as a positive and desirable political value, irrespective of the realities of corruption and 
lawlessness in Cambodian society. 
11 This is largely a function of degenerate variance among the first 
two items in Figure 1 (i.e., nearly everyone agrees with the statements). When these variables are omitted 
from the set, alpha climbs to .74 (with an average inter-item correlation of .50). Factor analysis confirms 
that the three-item set is unidimensional. Thus, on the basis of reasonably strong evidence of its face 
validity and reliability, we use the three-item index as our measure of support for the rule of law.12
 
 
 Cross-National Comparisons  
Support of the Cambodians for the rule of law seems to be reasonably widespread. But in order to 
gain clearer perspective on the case of Cambodia, it is useful to compare these data to comparable surveys 
in other countries. Two of the statements used in Cambodia have also been included in surveys we have 
conducted in other parts of the world (see Gibson 2007). Figures 2 and 3 report the comparative data from 
                                                 
10 For example, Cambodia ranks 166th out of 180 countries evaluated on Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perception Index, a ranking based on perceived levels of corruption as 
determined by expert assessments and opinion surveys (Transparency International, 2008).   
11 In turn, the low average inter-item correlation coefficient reflects a couple of negative 
correlations among the items, most of which are entirely trivial. One correlation, however, is not trivial: 
that between the first item in Figure 1 (government officers deserve the same punishment) and the last 
item (okay for government to suspend law). This correlation no doubt reflects the extreme lack of 
variance in the first item (as discussed further in the text).  
12Since two of the original items are in essence constants, it is not surprising that the correlation 




the various surveys in which these measures have been used. Many of these are established democracies 
in which one might assume support for the rule of law is deeply entrenched.13
[PLACE FIGURES 2 AND 3 ABOUT HERE] 
  
 For a variety of methodological reasons, care must always be taken in comparing cross-national 
survey results. Nonetheless, the conclusion to be drawn from these figures is that Cambodians are 
unusually strongly committed to the rule of law.  Indeed, these data suggest that, on the eve of the KR 
trials, support for the rule of law among ordinary Cambodians was uncommonly widespread. 
 The comparison between Cambodia and France is noteworthy. On the statement reported in 
Figure 2, 95 % of the Cambodians support the rule of law position, whereas only 67 % of the French 
respondents do so. From Figure 3 we see that 74 % of the Cambodians but only 48 % of the French favor 
the rule of law. Thus, these data strongly support the conclusion that Cambodians yearn for the rule of law 
even more than citizens of some societies in which the rule of law seems firmly established.14
 
 
Accounting for Variability in Support for the Rule of Law 
Next we consider whether support for the rule of law among ordinary Cambodians is related to two 
important variables: (1) age/generation, and (2) experiences of victimization under the KR regime. The 
first two of these variables were selected so as to try to estimate the contemporary residue of the KR 
atrocities. Since the young could not have directly experienced the KR regime, we hypothesize that older 
Cambodians express weakened support for the rule of law. As a more direct test of that hypothesis, we 
also examine whether being victimized under the KR regime is associated with lesser support for the rule 
of law.  
                                                 
13 Note that in some countries, data from more than a single survey are included.  
14It is worth reiterating that we do not argue that the beliefs of the mass public are the only 
attribute of importance when it comes to using law to protect against tyranny. The French have 
institutions, deeply legitimate ones, which could well be mobilized against tyrannical elites and masses. It 
is also conceivable that French elites are more committed to the rule of law than are ordinary French 
citizens. To repeat, the preferences of the mass public are only one element in a complex multivariate 
equation when it comes to preventing the rupture of the rule of law. 
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 Figure 4 reports the average response to the three rule-of-law statements for Cambodians of 
various age groups. As the data make clear, no relationship whatsoever exists between age and support for 
the rule of law. Older generations are not less likely to support the rule of law; the relationship is neither 
statistically nor substantively significant. Of course, age is only a rough surrogate for experiences under 
the Khmer Rouge regime, but from these data alone, it appears that those who survived KR rule are not 
less supportive of the rule of law than those who never lived under the hated regime. 
[PLACE FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 Have victimization experiences under the KR regime undermined support for the rule of law? 
Since this variable is quite theoretically interesting because it represents experiences directly at odds with 
the rule of law, we begin with an explication of the construction of the measure. 
 All respondents older than 35 years old were asked about whether they had experienced any of 10 
different types of trauma under the KR regime. Figure 5 reports the results. To reiterate, these figures do 
not represent all Cambodian adults but are instead confined to those who lived under the KR regime. 
[PLACE FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
The data reveal wide variability in the types of trauma experienced, ranging from a large majority 
of respondents claiming to have been forcibly separated from their families to a tiny number who said 
they were raped or sexually assaulted. A majority of these respondents asserted that they had been 
separated from their families, were involved in combat, and that they were close to death under the rule of 
the Khmer Rouge. Thus, trauma from that era was extremely widespread. Indeed, the average number of 
traumatic events experienced by these respondents is 3.1.  
 The conventional hypothesis is that experiences with victimization during the KR era reduced 
support for the rule of law. This is the oft-heard impunity argument: When citizens see governmental 
wrongdoing on a massive scale going unpunished they become cynical about the rule of law. And because 
citizen regard for the rule of law is thought to be weak and uncommon, a reconciliation process must have 
as one of its objectives the restoration of popular support for the rule of law. To test this hypothesis, 
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Figure 6 reports the simple relationship between victimization experiences and support for the rule of law 
among Cambodians older than 35 years old at the time of the interview.  
[PLACE FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
 As the figure depicts (and the statistics confirm), practically no relationship exists between 
victimization experiences and support for the rule of law. Rule of law attitudes vary insignificantly across 
the various levels of victimization. As the figure clearly shows, support for the rule of law has very little 
to do with being a victim of KR atrocities. 
 We believe this is an important empirical finding that runs counter to much conventional wisdom. 
Individual citizens need not directly experience violations of the rule of law; instead, observing the 
victimization of others has similar consequences for how one evaluates law. As with political effects of 
the economy (e.g., Mutz and Mondak 1997), it is not one’s own experiences (egocentric) that determine 
attitudes but rather one’s perceptions of the experiences of the society (sociotropic).  Especially given the 
breadth of the KR’s oppression of Cambodians, it seems to matter little whether an individual was 
victimized or not. The KR victimized the entire society. 
 
Discussion and Concluding Comments 
From the analysis presented in this paper, we draw several conclusions. First, on the eve of the KR trials, 
support for the rule of law is remarkably widespread in Cambodia. Second, we find no evidence 
whatsoever that disrespect for the rule of law is a legacy of the impunity the KR leaders enjoyed for 
decades. Instead, it seems that the failure to bring the miscreants to account for their deeds has made 
ordinary Cambodians value the rule of law more, not less. Finally, the results showing no difference in 
respect for the rule of law between those who were old enough to have lived through the KR era and those 
who were not indicate that it is not necessary for individuals to have experienced directly the repression 
of the KR. The KR affected the entire society, victims and bystanders alike, and the effect of its activities 
has been to elevate the rule of law in the hearts and minds of the Cambodian people. 
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We close this paper with a reiteration of our general argument about the effects of truth processes 
on a society. First, we assert that effects must be measured, not assumed. Second, measuring the 
consequences of truth processes is best accomplished through dynamic research designs in which change 
is actually assessed. Truth processes seek to change individuals and the societies in which they live. Static 
analysis is hard-pressed to draw firm conclusions about change. 
Most important, it is crucial to understand the state of society prior to the implementation of a 
truth process if one is going to draw conclusions about effects. Without understanding the high level of 
support for the rule of law prior to the start of the ECCC, one might erroneously conclude that the process 
has created an elevated reverence for law. In fact, it seems more likely to us that societal support for the 
rule of law has led to demands for accountability for the leaders of the KR, and that therefore Cambodia’s 
political culture may be a cause of the tribunal rather than an effect (although effects other than attitudes 
toward the rule of law are of course possible). Assessing the hypothesis that truth leads to reconciliation is 
a tricky and complicated business. The best approach to testing that hypothesis is to measure the state of 
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Note: The items (and the rule of law position) are: 
 
Government officials who are guilty of crimes deserve the same punishment as anyone else.  (Agree) 
 
An individual is obligated to obey the law for the good of society as a whole, even if he/she finds it 
personally unjustifiable. (Agree) 
 
Sometimes it might be better to ignore the law and solve problems immediately rather than wait for 
 a legal solution. (Disagree) 
 
It’s alright to get around the law as long as you don’t actually break it. (Disagree) 
 
In times of emergency, the government ought to be able to suspend the law in order to solve pressing  



































































































































































Figure 4. Respondent Age and Support for the Rule of Law 
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Figure 6. Victimization Experiences and Support for the Rule of Law 
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